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While the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of  1988 received much 
less attention in the United States than the follow-up agreement that included 
Mexico, it drew adamant criticism in Canada. The 1988 federal elections were 
considered a referendum on free trade with the United States. Although  the 
party in favor of the FTA carried a majority, opposition to the agreement per- 
sisted. In the early 1990s, critics attributed the alleged loss of 350,000 manu- 
facturing jobs to the elimination of tariffs between the countries. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine changes in Canadian and U.S. manufacturing indus- 
tries and relate those changes to the removal of trade barriers. We use a general- 
ized version of Krugman’s (1980) trade model to predict the expected change 
in the relative size of Canada’s manufacturing  industries resulting from tariff 
reductions. Since the restrictive version of the theory appears unable to explain 
the main features of  the data, we will also consider extensions of the model 
that allow for differences in cost and demand structures. 
Import protection in Canada dates back to the National Economic Policy of 
1878. In an effort to avoid being solely a nation of “hewers of wood and draw- 
ers of  water,” Canada imposed large tariffs  on manufacturing  imports. One 
hundred ten years later, successive GATT rounds had reduced average tariffs 
on goods to 4.5 percent. Nonetheless,  the government provided  significantly 
greater protection  to a number of  industries. The size and proximity  of the 
United  States suggested  to many that even  small tariff  changes might have 
large consequences. 
To date, there have been few studies of the actual effects of the FTA, partly 
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since the data have only recently become available. Gaston and Trefler (1994), 
Hazledine (1994), and Statistics Canada (1993) are recent papers on the topic. 
These  papers,  which  examine  two-digit  Standard  Industrial  Classification 
(SIC) manufacturing industries, have concentrated on documenting “what hap- 
pened”  without developing formal economic models. The Statistics Canada 
study finds correlations of  -0.8  and -0.7  between initial tariffs and the U.S. 
and  Canadian  propensity  to import from each  other. The strong correlation 
indicates that liberalization had potentially large effects on North American 
manufacturing  through  its  effect  on  import  penetration.  Gaston  and  Tref- 
ler show that employment changes are positively related to changes in Cana- 
dian tariffs (hence, the lowering of  Canadian trade  barriers reduces output), 
while Hazledine does not find statistically significant relations between tariff 
changes and Canadian shipments. 
In this paper, we take an alternative route of attempting to link our examina- 
tion of the change in the relative size of each Canadian industry to the predic- 
tions of a specific trade model. We match Census of Manufactures data from 
the United  States and Canada to examine industry changes occurring at the 
four-digit SIC level, This allows us to examine a large number of relatively 
disaggregated industries with greater variation in tariffs and other characteris- 
tics than  those analyzed  in the other studies. Before developing the formal 
model, it seems worth considering several possible accounts of what might be 
expected to happen to a small country when it liberalizes manufacturing trade 
with a larger neighbor. 
Simple notions of Ricardian comparative advantage would predict that free 
trade would cause Canada’s relative output share to expand in industries where 
Canadian  workers are relatively  productive. The problem with applying this 
theory is that it predicts one-way trade, whereas most North American manu- 
facturing industries exhibit two-way trade. For instance, Canada’s largest ex- 
port industry, automobile-related products, is also its largest import industry. 
Table 12.1 depicts several aspects of North American manufacturing trade 
by  major industry  group (according to the Canadian two-digit  classification 
system) prior to the FTA. The first data column shows each industry’s Grubel- 
Lloyd (1975) intraindustry trade index. The second column lists the share of 
each  industry’s trade in  total manufacturing  trade between  Canada  and  the 
United States. The final column shows Canadian exports divided by imports. 
The table reveals a large amount of two-way trade within industries. Transport 
equipment, the industry  with by  far the largest trade  share, realizes  almost 
balanced trade. The trade data suggest that we move in the direction of a model 
that is consistent with intraindustry trade. 
Some proponents of freer trade argued that Canada could reduce its trade 
barriers, obtain efficiency gains, and maintain its North American production 
shares. The reasoning  was that,  under  protection,  Canadian  plants  produce 
multiple product lines in order to serve the local market’s demand for variety. 
With free trade, these  plants  would  specialize  in particular lines, achieving 325  Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Table 12.1  North American Trade in Manufactures, 198.547 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1993). 
Note: IIT is the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) intraindustry trade index, 2 min (X,,  X,)I(X,  + X,,J 
where X, are Canada’s exports to the United States and X,are  U.S. exports to Canada. “Share” is 
the portion of total manufacturing trade between Canada and the United States in each industry 
group. 
lower costs through larger  production  runs. Meanwhile, plants  south of  the 
border would specialize as well. Increased trade flows would maintain the level 
of  product  variety  in both markets. The end result would be less duplication 
without net shrinkage or loss of product diversity. 
Adherents to this sanguine view of the likely effects of free trade pointed to 
the experience of  the automobile industry as a prototype for an across-the- 
board free trade agreement. In 1965, the United States and Canada eliminated 
tariffs in automotive-related  products.  “Safeguards”  requiring  that Canadian 
production  not drop below 75 percent of  Canadian sales for any vehicle pro- 
ducer never posed a binding constraint on the manufacturers. Instead, even as 
the Big Three rationalized production, Canada’s share of  North American ve- 
hicle assembly rose from 7 percent in  1965 to 15 percent in the early  1980s 
(US.-Canada Automotive Agreement Policy Research Project 1985). 
The theory sketched above makes no reference to the market-size asymme- 
try between the United States and Canada. When trade impediments impose 
additional costs on exports, firms prefer to locate in the larger country in order 326  Keith Head and John Ries 
to avoid incurring these costs. This incentive gives the large country an inher- 
ent advantage attracting firms. Trade liberalization that achieves a truly inte- 
grated market would eliminate large countries’ size advantage. However, even 
in the absence of tariffs, impediments to trade will remain. At the very least, 
there will be transportation costs; moreover, frontier controls, cabotage restric- 
tions, and exchange rate risk may pose significant barriers to trade. This im- 
plies that, even after trade liberalization,  the small country will have incom- 
plete access to consumers in the larger country. Formal modeling is required 
to predict  the precise  effect  of  tariff  reductions  in these circumstances,  but 
adjustments certainly involve more than the simple shift in the composition of 
product lines suggested above. 
In section  12.1, we develop a model  in which the market-size  asymmetry 
between the United States and Canada tends to promote concentration of pro- 
duction  in  the  larger country.  The model predicts  that Canada’s production 
share in differentiated product industries will be smaller than Canada’s expen- 
ditures share unless there are substantial offsetting asymmetries in trade bam- 
ers or costs. While bilateral trade liberalization offers firms in the small coun- 
try greater access to the large market, it will nevertheless tend to reduce the 
relative size of  the small country’s differentiated-product  industries.  Section 
12.2 matches industry  data from Canadian and U.S.  sources and examines 
whether initial relative size and the changes between  1987 and 1992 conform 
to the predictions of the monopolistic-competition  model. Our main results are 
the  following:  (1) Canada’s  relative  shipments declined between  1987 and 
1992 in 83 percent of the matched industries. (2) The industries that were large 
in Canada relative to the United States in 1987 tended to decline the most over 
the subsequent five years. (3) Regression  analysis of the changes in relative 
size finds significant negative effects of Canadian tariff reductions after includ- 
ing controls for industry  sensitivity to the business cycle and exchange rate 
movements. 
12.1  The Monopolistic-Competition Trade Model 
We  examine the  effects of  the FTA  in  the context  of  the monopolistic- 
competition trade model developed  in Helpman and Krugman (1985). Their 
model has three main components: constant elasticity preferences over differ- 
entiated products, zero-profit entry equilibrium, and trade barriers. We general- 
ize the model in two ways. First, as in Krugman and Hanson (1993), we decom- 
pose trade barriers into tariffs and other border costs (all trade impediments 
that remain after a free trade agreement is implemented). Second, we allow for 
industry-specific  marginal  cost differences.  This last assumption  makes our 
model  a hybrid  in  which trade  arises from both  product  differentiation  and 
standard comparative advantage. 
Total utility is given by  U(u,,  u?, u7,  . . .) in the home country and U*(u,,  u2, 327  Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
u,, . . .) in the foreign country' Each industry comprises either differentiated 
products  or homogenous goods. The form of  each subutility function  u, de- 
pends on  whether i is a differentiated-products  industry  or a homogeneous 
product. Let C,l denote consumption of industry i goods produced  by  firm j. 
For homogeneous goods, u, = 1,  C,l,  that is, the consumer cares only about 
total consumption, not the identity of the manufacturer. In contrast, demand 
for the output of firmj  in differentiated-products  industry i is derived from a 
subutility function with a constant elasticity of  substitution between varieties 
equal to u,.  We now suppress the i subscript and focus on the determination of 
equilibrium in a particular differentiated-products  industry. 
In the monopolistic-competition  model, firms specialize in the production 
of  a single good in a single location.'  Costs consist  of  a fixed cost, F, and 
constant marginal costs, c. It is customary to assume that the firm maximizes 
its profits with respect to a perceived elasticity of demand equal to IT, the elas- 
ticity of substitution between varieties, yielding 
Entry occurs until price is driven to average cost. 
will produce 
This implies that each firm 
(a - 1)F 
9 = 
C 
Consider representative domestic and foreign firms with costs c and c-. Rela- 
tive prices (at the factory door) will be p/p* = c/c",  whereas relative per-firm 
outputs will be q/q' = c*/c.  Note that these relations imply that relative industry 
shipments, S/S*  =  pqn/p*q*n*,  equal the relative number of varieties produced 
at home and abroad (n/n*).  When labor is the only input and used  in fixed 
proportions (the usual assumption in models of this type), relative employment 
(LIL') will also equal nln". 
Trade barriers  create wedges between  the price paid for locally produced 
and imported products.  Consumers in  the  home  country  pay  p  for home- 
produced goods andp*T  for imports. Similarly, consumers in the foreign coun- 
try pay p*  for foreign-made goods andp~'  for goods they import from the home 
I. We  focus on bilateral trade between the United  States and Canada and, therefore. ignore 
third-country competition and markets. The small country, Canada, will be referred to as the home 
cuimtry. Third countries tend to have small shares of the North American market. Across twenty- 
two two-digit  industries, the U.S. and Canadian share of the combined market is over 90 percent 
in fifteen cases, over 80 percent in nineteen cases, and over 70 percent in twenty-one cases, with 
this share being relatively  low (48 percent) only in the case of leather. 
2. This is a very restrictive  assumption since it rules out both  multiproduct and multinational 
enterprises. The investigation of how the effect of  trade liberalizations depends on whether firms 
have multiple plants or products will be left for future research. 328  Keith Head and John Ries 
country.  We  decompose total  trade  impediments into  the  intrinsic  costs of 
transborder shipments, K, and ad valorem tariffs, t and t*: 
T  = (1 + K)(I  + r), 
7'  1  (1 f K)( 1 + [*), 
where K includes transborder transaction costs such as freight, insurance, ex- 
change rate hedges, customs documentation, and the threat of antidumping or 
countervailing duties.' 
We now turn back to consumer demand to derive the equilibrium distribu- 
tion of production. Let E and E'  denote the total expenditures at home and in 
the foreign country on the products  in a particular  industry. Let x equal the 
share of  home expenditures devoted to  home-produced varieties and x*  the 
share of foreign expenditures on foreign-produced varieties. Total shipments 
from each country, S and S*,  comprise production for the national market and 
exports. Using the notation defined above, we obtain 
(3)  s = xE + (1 -  x')E", 
(4)  S'  1  x'E'  + (1 -  x)E. 
In the basic monopolistic-competition  model, the allocation of expenditures 
between domestic and imported varieties depends solely on the prices that con- 
sumers face. We generalize the model to allow for an asymmetry between do- 
mestic and imported varieties in the utility function. Specifically, denoting H 
and F as the sets of home- and foreign-produced varieties, the subutility func- 
tion for any industry is 
where p measures the degree to which, on average, consumers prefer home- 
produced  varieties (p > 1) or foreign varieties (p < I). A value of  p larger 
than one need not represent nationalistic preferences; rather, it could be viewed 
as a shortcut for getting at the idea that domestic firms choose to produce prod- 
uct varieties that match domestic tastes. 
Utility maximization subject to prices p and p'  yields 
3. McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1995)  have found evidence of very strong effects of national 
borders on trade volumes. After controlling for distance and economy size, the volume of trade 
between two Canadian provinces is twenty times larger than the volume of trade between a prov- 
ince and an American state. 329  Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Note that any observed domestic expenditure share, x,  for given factory prices, 
p  and p*,  can arise either because of high trade impediments, T, or home bias 
in preferences,  p. Since PT  and  PT*  always  appear raised  to the  power  of 
1 -  u, results are streamlined somewhat by defining 
p  [p(1 + K)(1 + l)]'-" 
and 
p"  [@(I  + K)(1 + t*)]'-". 
These variables  can be  interpreted  as indicators  of  "openness"  to interna- 
tional trade. 
Division by p' in the numerators and denominators of equations (5) and (6) 
expresses x and x*  in terms of (p/p*)"-'.  Recall that relative prices equal relative 
marginal costs. Hence, substitution yields 8 = (c/c*)"-'  as an additional deter- 
minant of expenditure allocation. Thus, we have reduced x and x*  to functions 
of p, p*, and 8. Substituting these expressions into equations (3) and (4), and 
solving for relative shipments, we obtain 
(7) 
This equation forms the theoretical basis for our empirical analysis of the rela- 
tive size of Canadian manufacturing industries and the changes brought about 
by trade liberalization. Since it is highly nonlinear, we will examine its impli- 
cations using graphs. We will consider first the case of symmetric costs, prefer- 
ences, and trade barriers. Thus, the only difference between the two countries 
is size. By assuming that c = c*,  we focus on trade driven entirely by product 
differentiation. Let a,  and a,*  equal the share of GDP spent on industry  i at 
home  and in  the  foreign country.  Assuming these  shares to be  constants, 
E,/E: = (a/al*)(GDP/GDP*).  Hence, if preferences are identical, that is, a,  = 
a,*,  relative expenditures will equal relative GDP. The assumptions of symmet- 
ric costs and preferences  allow us to obtain two stark predictions,  which are 
illustrated in figure 12.1. 
Figure 12.1 plots relative shipments of the small country as a function of 
symmetric trade barriers for three different values for the elasticity of  substitu- 
tion. The horizontal line at 0.1 represents relative expenditures since that is the 
approximate ratio of Canadian to U.S. GDP. Two results stand out. First, rela- 
tive shipments for the small country lie strictly below its relative GDP. Second, 
relative size falls as trade impediments decline. The intuition for these results 
is that, from the point of view of minimizing trade costs, firms want to locate 
in the large market and pay border costs only on the small share of goods they 
export to the small market. However, the trade-cost-inflated prices in the small 
market give at least a few firms  the incentive to locate there. A symmetric 
reduction in trade costs tilts the balance somewhat in favor of the large country. 330  Keith Head and John Ries 
Fig. 12.1 
substitution 
Relative industry size, trade barriers, and the elasticity of 
The model predicts that the industry in the small country will disappear alto- 
gether if trade costs (including home bias in preferences) become sufficiently 
small. The figure also shows how the responsiveness of industry output to trade 
is a function of the elasticity of substitution. Small values of u correspond to 
industries where, in equilibrium, economies of scale are more important. The 
lower the value of u, the greater is the pressure for the industry to concentrate 
in the large country. 
Figure 12.2 shows the effect of a cost advantage on relative industry size of 
the small country. Notably, cost advantages possessed  by  firms in the small 
country are not always sufficient to offset the market size disadvantage and 
result in relative output exceeding relative expenditures. When relative costs 
are 0.70, the small country will enjoy a relatively high industry share, which is 
magnified by liberalization. However, when the cost advantage is smaller, for 
a large range of trade impediments, relative size is less than relative expendi- 
tures. Moreover, trade liberalization does not necessarily raise relative industry 
size.? However,  one clear prediction  emerges-when  cost advantages yield 
higher Canadian industry shares than expenditure shares, liberalization causes 
a relative expansion of the Canadian industry. 
The cases discussed thus far consider bilateral reductions of symmetric trade 
barriers.  Since Canada  generally  had  higher  levels  of  protection  than  the 
United States in  1987, we need to discuss the effect  of  liberalization  under 
asymmetric protection. The contour plot in figure 12.3 adds a dimension to the 
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Relative industry size, trade barriers, and relative marginal costs 
previous  graphic analysis by  showing relative industry  size as a function  of 
trade barriers in each country. (Here, we revert to the assumption of equal mar- 
ginal costs.) The contour where relative industry  size equals 0.1 represents 
combinations of  T  and -r* that yield relative industry  sizes equal to relative 
expenditures in  the two  countries. Combinations below  this  contour corre- 
spond to industry  shares for the small country  that exceed relative expendi- 
tures. This indicates that relatively high small-country industry shares are pos- 
sible even without a cost advantage. However, levels of protection in the small 
country must be quite large relative to protection  in the big country. In this 
figure, bilateral liberalization corresponds to movements toward the origin. As 
the arrow indicates, it is possible for liberalization to increase the relative size 
of  the small country's industry. However, if both countries have the same re- 
maining  trade impediments, that  is,  if  free trade  corresponds to a position 
along the diagonal where  T  = T',  then tariff reductions  are certain  to lower 
small-country industry shares. 
To summarize, the model allows for a variety of possible results, but it also 
offers some general predictions. First, if Canada does not have a cost advan- 
tage, a symmetric trade liberalization  will reduce Canadian relative industry 
size. Second, two effects are possible when Canadian industries start out with 
higher industry shares than relative expenditures. If the high share is a conse- 
quence of relatively high Canadian trade barriers, then the removal of the pro- 
tection  will lower the relative size of the Canadian industry. When it is the 
outcome of a cost advantage, Canada's  share should rise. In the next section, 
we examine the changes that occurred in North American manufacturing  to 
see whether actual changes are consistent with the predictions of the model. 332  Keith Head and John Ries 
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Fig. 12.3  Relative industry size with asymmetric trade costs 
12.2  Relative Industry Size before and after the FTA 
Canada and the United States use different industry classification  systems. 
In  1991, the  two countries  developed  a correspondence,  but, unfortunately, 
there are many cases where part of a U.S. industry is assigned to one Canadian 
industry and part to another. In most cases, we were able to use seven-digit 
product-class data from the U.S. census to apportion U.S. SICS into our con- 
structed industries. For instance, we  were  able to create a balanced  “wine” 
industry by subtracting the brandy proportion of  the U.S. “wine and brandy” 
industry. In addition, missing Canadian data for certain industries poses a prob- 
lem. Ultimately, we obtained data and a satisfactory correspondence for 128 
industries accounting for 77 percent of Canadian manufacturing shipments and 
72 percent of U.S. shipments. Canadian industries are often more aggregated 
than their U.S. counterparts. Hence, many of our composite industries are simi- 
lar to three-digit U.S. industries. Complete documentation for the correspon- 
dence is available from the authors (Head, Ries, and Zhang 1995). 
Table 12.2 lists the ratio of Canadian industry size to U.S. industry size for 
three measures of size-the  value of shipments, employment, and the number 
of establishments. Close to half the  128 industries we constructed had Cana- 
dian relative shipments in excess of Canada’s relative GDP in 1987 (0.1004 at 
the PPP  [purchasing power parity] exchange rate).5 Moreover, contradictory 
5. Ideally, we would compare relative shipments to industry-level relative expenditures. How- 
ever, to calculate relative expenditures requires information on production, imports, and exports. 
It is quite difficult to match trade flows to domestic production for disaggregated industries. How- 
ever, Statistics Canada information for two-digit SIC industries is available and shows that relative 
Canadian expenditures range from a low of 0.056 (other manufacturing) to a high of 0.1 14 (leather 
and allied products) with the larger machinery, transport equipment, and electrical and electronic 
productions taking values of 0.095, 0.082, and 0.058. 333  Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Table 12.2  Relative Canadian-U.S. Manufacturing Performance 
1987  1992 
Q1  Median  43  QI  Median  Q3 
Shipments  ,065  ,094  ,124  .052  ,073  ,105 
Establishments  .09  1  ,116  ,170  ,078  ,110  ,164 
Value added per hour  ,520  ,664  ,850  ,533  ,694  .82S 
Employment  .084  .125  ,162  .074  ,103  ,147 
Shipments per establishment  ,526  ,749  1.027  ,484  ,684  ,888 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Canadian and US.  censuses of manufac- 
turing. 
Note: Q1 and 43  are the upper bounds of  the first and third quartiles of the sample consisting of 
I28 constructed manufacturing industries. We  convert to a common currency using the PPP ex- 
change rate of 0.827 in  1987 and 0.845 in 1992. 
to the theory,  the relative number  of  establishments does not  equal relative 
shipments. On the contrary, Canadian establishments appear to be systemati- 
cally smaller than U.S. establishments in the same industry. This fact is incon- 
sistent with the simple monopolistic-competition  model. 
Relative employment also frequently exceeds Canada’s GDP share and gen- 
erally lies  above the shipments share.6 The median Canadian establishment 
appears to have about the same number of workers as its U.S. counterpart, but 
these workers produce substantially less per hour.’  Workers in Canada appear 
to generate only two-thirds the value added per hour of U.S. workers in the 
same industry. Although value added per hour is a crude measure of productiv- 
ity in that it fails to control for price differences or the levels of other factors of 
production, these results conform with Baldwin, Gorecki, and McVey’s ( 1986) 
finding that total factor productivity in Canadian manufacturing industries av- 
eraged 0.7 of the productivity in the same U.S. industries. Using PPP exchange 
rates,  median relative productivity  increased  only a  small  amount between 
1987 and 1992. 
While Canada enjoyed 10 percent lower manufacturing wages in 1987, this 
was not  sufficient to offset  lower value added per worker.  By  1992, owing 
largely to the stronger Canadian dollar, this wage advantage had disappeared. 
It seems clear that, if cost advantages are to explain the prevalence of Canadian 
industries that are larger than one-tenth the size of their American counterparts, 
input costs other than labor must be responsible. Unfortunately, we lack infor- 
mation about the unit costs of  other factors and intermediate goods. 
An inspection of table 12.2  reveals that the relative size of Canadian industry 
6. The two are highly correlated, however: 0.98 in  1987 and 1992. 
7. Using the same data set, John Helliwell found that, in both Canada and the United States, 
worker value added per employee tended to be lower in high-tariff industries. Helliwell’s regreu- 
sion analysis also revealed that industries with more employees per establishment generated more 
value added per employee, although this result did not extend to relative productivity. 334  Keith Head and John Ries 
fell from 1987 to 1992. It is well documented that employment in both Cana- 
dian and U.S. manufacturing declined over this period (see, e.g., Gaston and 
Trefler 1994). The fact that the decline was relatively greater in Canada is con- 
sistent with a main tenet of the theory-the  larger country starts out with an 
advantage that tends to be reenforced by trade liberalization. We now turn to 
an examination of whether the theory can explain the outcomes in individual 
industries. 
Consider a  scatter  diagram that  charts changes in  industry  relative  size 
against initial relative size, with the diagram divided into quadrants by lines 
corresponding to relative change equal to zero and relative size equal to 0.1 
(the relative GDP of Canada). The basic monopolistic-competition  theory pre- 
dicts that, with symmetric costs and trade barriers and expenditure shares equal 
to GDP shares, all points  should lie in the lower-left-hand quadrant; that is, 
Canadian manufacturing industries should start out small, and then trade liber- 
alization  should further reduce their size relative to the corresponding U.S. 
industries. If Canadian firms enjoy large cost advantages, then we would also 
expect observations in the upper-right-hand  quadrant. That is, if a Canadian 
industry has a large-enough cost advantage so that its production share exceeds 
its GDP share, liberalization may cause it to grow larger. The upper-left-hand 
quadrant is a possibility if the Canadian industry has an intermediate cost ad- 
vantage and its trajectory corresponds to the U shape depicted in figure 12.2 
above. Thus, only a quite specific combination of parameters will put an indus- 
try into the upper-left-hand quadrant. Relative size may also exceed 0.1 if Can- 
ada has much higher levels of import protection  (either from tariffs or asym- 
metric transport costs). In that case, we expect trade liberalization  to reduce 
Canada’s relative size. Hence, the lower-right-hand quadrant is also possible if 
there are large asymmetries in trade barriers. 
Figure 12.4 plots Canadian and US.  tariffs for each industry in 1987. Tariffs 
levels are generally small but range as high as 22.7 percent. Since the majority 
of the points are below the diagonal line, it is clear that Canadian tariffs are 
generally higher than U.S. tariffs. These tariff asymmetries provide an avenue 
for the relative size of Canadian industry to exceed relative expenditures. Once 
protection is removed, then the relative size of these industries should fall, and 
we could obtain observations in the lower-right-hand quadrant of the hypothet- 
ical scatter diagram. 
We employ a simulation to investigate more fully our model’s predictions of 
the effect that tariff  reductions  under the FTA had on relative industry  size. 
The theory tells us that changes in industry  size depend on key parameters 
such as relative production costs and relative trade costs as well as the elasticity 
of substitution. Unfortunately, while we know tariff reductions, we do not ob- 
serve other important industry  characteristics.  The simulation randomly  as- 
signs parameter values to industries. In the case of Canadian and U.S. tariffs, 
the simulation generates t and t’ with the means, standard deviations, and co- 
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Fig. 12.4  Import tariffs in Canada and the United States in 1987 
eters in the model-border  costs, home bias, the elasticity of substitution be- 
tween varieties, and relative marginal costs-are  set so as to be reasonable and 
also to yield an initial distribution of relative size that approximates the 1987 
distribution.x  This assignment allows us to generate relative size before  and 
after the removal of tariffs. Relative size is measured as Canadian shipments 
divided by U.S. shipments. 
The results of the simulation are presented in figure 12.5, which is a scatter 
diagram divided into the quadrants defined above. Virtually  all the points are 
in either the lower-left- or the upper-right-hand  quadrants. The lower-left-hand 
quandrant corresponds to industries that start out with shipments ratios below 
0.1 and decline with the removal of the tariff. These are Canadian industries 
that do not have a cost advantage vis-l-vis U.S. industries, and liberalization 
therefore shifts production to the larger country. Points in the upper-right-hand 
quandrant are industries where Canada has a comparative advantage, and im- 
proved access to the U.S. therefore increases Canada's relative production. In- 
terestingly, the simulation shows that tariff asymmetries are not large enough 
to generate points in the lower-right-hand quandrant. Thus, while in principle 
Canadian industries can initially be large owing to asymmetric protection and 
then decline with liberalization,  in practice it appears that these asymmetries 
are not sufficiently high. Overall, the simulations exhibit a positively  sloped 
scattered diagram where relatively large Canadian industries grow and small 
Canadian industries decline with tariff reductions. 
8.  Specifically, u is uniformly distributed between 3 and 7 (the implied markups over marginal 
costs vary from 14 to 33 percent), c/c'  is uniform between 0.5 and 1.5, and the combined home 
bias and border cost, p(  1 + K), varies uniformly between 1.5 and 4. 336  Keith Head and John Ries 
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Fig. 12.5  Simulated changes in relative shipments 
Figure  12.6 plots the actual data and presents a very different pattern than 
anticipated.  Only industries with initial relative  shipments less than 0.5 are 
included in the diagram. This eliminates just three industries: fur goods, pulp, 
and  newsprint. The last two industries  were  actually larger than their U.S. 
counterparts (with relative shipments of 1.1  and 2.3). All three declined sharply 
in relative size between 1987 and 1992. An examination of the quadrant figure 
reveals that most of  the points lie in the lower two quadrants (106 of  128). 
Moreover, contrary to our expectations, the diagram suggests that, the larger a 
Canadian  industry was in  1987, the more it tended to shrink relative  to its 
U.S. counterpart. 
We may rule out some potential explanations for these features of the data. 
First,  by  construction,  common  business-cycle  effects  or trends  away from 
manufacturing into services will not affect relative shipments. Similarly, if all 
North American  consumers begin  to avoid products  made from asbestos  or 
animal furs (two industries in our sample), relative shipments would be unaf- 
fected. Second, while Canada’s relatively large pre-FTA tariffs seem consistent 
with the idea that the high-protection industries would start out largest relative 
to the United States and decline the most, the simulations show that the tariff 
asymmetries  were  too  small  to  generate  the  negative  correlation  between 
changes and initial levels. Furthermore, most of the large industries that de- 
clined were resource-intensive industries with low Canadian tariffs (newsprint, 
pulp, nonferrous refining, fish products). 
The negative  correlation  that appears in  figure  12.6 does not  necessarily 
imply that relative industry size is converging. As formalized in Quah (1993), 
even if there is no underlying change in the distribution of some cross section 337  Effects of the Canada-US. Free Trade Agreement 
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Fig.12.6  Actual changes in relative shipments 
of data, we would expect changes to be negatively related to initial levels. The 
intuition is that, if the parameters that determine relative size are not fixed over 
time, then the industries that are particularly large at any moment are likely to 
be ones that were “lucky” that period. Five years later, those favorable circum- 
stances are likely to have receded somewhat. Quah considers the case where 
each cross-sectional unit has its own distribution from which each time period 
is a random,  independent  draw. Under those assumptions, the regression  of 
changes on initial conditions will yield a negative coefficient. An alternative 
procedure (suggested by our discussant, John Helliwell) consists of regressing 
changes on the average of initial and final levels, which results in a zero coef- 
ficient under the Quah scenario. A positive or  negative estimate of the coeffi- 
cient indicates a rise or fall of  the cross-sectional  ~ariance.~  The regression 
of  changes in relative shipments on initial (1987) relative shipments yields a 
coefficient of  -0.20  with standard errors of 0.03. The coefficient declines but 
remains significantly negative at -0.16  when we replace the  1987 value with 
the average of  1987 and 1992 relative shipments. Thus, there has been a reduc- 
tion in the dispersion of relative industry size during the period we study. 
Changes in the macroeconomic environment serve as potential explanations 
for the pattern of changes in relative shipments. First, the Canadian dollar ap- 
9. To  see why, define y; and y;  as the initial and final data for some industry. Each y’ may be 
drawn from a different distribution as long as draws at different time periods are independent. Let 
Ay, = y; -  y;  and j’  = 6;  + y;)/2.  A regression of  Ay  on  will yield a coefficient equal to the 
cross-sectional covariance of Ay and L  divided by the cross-sectional variance of j.  The covariance 
term will equal (V, -  VJ2, where V,  and V,,  are the final and initial cross-sectional variances of 
?J,  and yo. Thus, an expansion in the cross-sectional variance, V, > V,,  implies a positive coefficient 
in the regression. 338  Keith Head and John Ries 
preciated  11 percent against the U.S. dollar during the period 1987-92  (and by 
21 percent from 1986 to 1991), raising the relative cost of production in Can- 
ada. In addition, the sample period was characterized by a decline into reces- 
sion that appears to have been more severe in Canada than in the United States. 
An interest rate differential emerged in the late 1980s, peaking at 4 percentage 
points in 1990. In the context of the model, exchange rate appreciation would 
raise relative marginal costs, cIc',  whereas a deeper recession or  higher interest 
rates in Canada would tend to lower relative expenditures, EIE". While these 
factors could easily explain relative shipments declines in certain industries, it 
is not obvious why the largest Canadian industries would experience the big- 
gest declines. It could be the case that industries sensitive to macroeconomic 
changes simply happened to be relatively large in Canada. It is also possible 
that the conditions that made Canadian industries large also led to large reduc- 
tions under adverse macroeconomic conditions. 
Exchange rate appreciation raising CIC'  will have the greatest negative effect 
on industries  that  have low trade costs or home bias. A  cost advantage for 
Canada translates into high exports and relatively large shipments when import 
barriers are low. When currency appreciation undermines this cost advantage, 
exports and relative size decline. Thus, low trade costs may account for obser- 
vations  in  the  lower-right-hand  quadrant.  This same logic, however,  argues 
that, when trade costs are low, comparatively  disadvantaged Canadian indus- 
tries would  start out small and lose significantly with the appreciation. Thus, 
rather  than  a  downward  slope,  differences  in  trade  sensitivity  imply  an 
inverted-U pattern  in which trade-insensitive  industries have shipment ratios 
roughly equivalent to relative expenditures and are largely unaffected  by the 
appreciation. 
Relative expenditures in Canada could be lowered by  deeper recession  or 
higher interest rates. If the Canadian and U.S. economies were fully integrated, 
Canadian producers  would be no more affected by  declines in Canadian de- 
mand than U.S. producers. Thus, the geographic distribution of demand would 
not affect the distribution of production.  Since the North American economy 
is only partially integrated, declines in EIE*  may account for the reductions in 
the relative size of Canadian manufacturing industries. There seems to be little 
a priori reason for the declines in relative expenditure to be largest in the indus- 
tries with high Canadian relative shipments.'O Hence,  we do not expect the 
inclusion of macroeconomic sensitivity variables to eliminate the negative size 
effect. Nevertheless,  in assessing the effects of tariffs on relative shipments, 
we want to control for characteristics of industries that make them likely to be 
more affected by the business downturn  in  1990-92  and the accompanying 
high Canadian interest rates. 
10. Differences  between the Canadian  and the U.S. share of  GDP expended on goods of a 
particular  industry could, however, generate  such a result. The industries on which Canadians 
spend a disproportionate amount would tend to be relatively large and also be the most affected 
by a decline in Canada's GDP relative to the United States. 339  Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Table 12.3  Changes in Relative Manufacturing Size after the FTA 
Dependent Variable: A(S/S') 
Constant 
Size (S/S') 
Canadian tariff\  (I  Arc  I) 






































































Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts a, 
b, and c indicate significance in a two-tailed test at the  1, 5, and  10 percent  levels. Size is the 
average of  1987 and 1992 relative shipments. 
We now turn to statistical analysis to estimate the strength of  the link be- 
tween trade liberalization  and relative manufacturing  performance while in- 
cluding controls for changes in macroeconomic conditions. Table 12.3 reports 
regression estimates of the effects of changes in tariffs and the macroeconomy 
on changes in the relative size of manufacturing industries."  In each specifica- 
tion, we include the average of the industry's  1987 and 1992 relative shipments 
as  a  covariate.  Its coefficient  reflects  the  tendency  of  the  industry  cross- 
sectional variance to expand or decline after conditioning on other observed 
characteristics of the industry. 
The first two columns show that  the removal  of both Canadian and U.S. 
tariffs is associated with lower Canadian relative shipments. When we enter 
Canadian tariff levels alone, the effect is highly significant. Thus, the elimina- 
tion of Canadian tariff protection appeared to have led to the relative contrac- 
tion of Canadian industry. When we include both tariff  levels, the Canadian 
tariff  remains significant at the  10  percent confidence  level,  while the U.S. 
tariff variable enters with a perverse sign but is not statistically significant. 
I  1. The regression sample excludes three extreme observations: fur goods, pulp, and newsprint. 
These industries were the three largest relative to the United States in  1987 (with relative ship- 
ments of  0.76, 1.1, 2.3). They also experienced declines that were an order of  magnitude larger 
than the average for other industries (-0.37,  -0.44,  and -0.74,  compared to -0.02). 340  Keith Head and John Ries 
The following three columns display results when we add controls for indus- 
try  sensitivity to exchange rate appreciation  and the deeper Canadian reces- 
sion. “Openness” is calculated  as the 1987-92  average of bilateral  trade di- 
vided by the sum of Canadian and US. production in North America. We use 
it as a proxy for each industry’s trade impediments. Open industries are more 
vulnerable  to exchange rate appreciation.  Column 3 shows that the variable 
obtains the expected negative sign, but the estimate is insignificantly different 
from zero. Thus, we  find little evidence that  exchange rate  appreciation  af- 
fected the pattern of changes across industries. 
Columns  4  and  5  present  results  incorporating  variables  representing 
business-cycle  sensitivity. The “cyclical sensitivity” variable employed in the 
column 4 regression  is based  on Bloskie’s (1991) study of the performance 
of two-digit industries during the last eight recessions preceeding the one in 
1991-92.  Bloskie calculated  the average percentage  drop in output from the 
last quarter prior to the recession to the last quarter of the recession. The nega- 
tive coefficient estimate supports the hypothesis that cyclically sensitive indus- 
tries declined disproportionately in Canada. Somewhat stronger results obtain 
for an alternative measure of business-cycle sensitivity, “durable goods,” which 
is an indicator variable based on the Statistics Canada classification.12 Given 
the relatively high interest rates that prevailed in Canada from 1989 to 1991, it 
seems likely that durable-goods industries would decline disproportionately in 
Canada. Column 2 results bear this expectation out; the durable-goods effect 
is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. 
The results appearing in table 12.3 suggest that both Canadian tariff reduc- 
tions and a deeper Canadian recession share responsibility for the tendency of 
Canadian industries  to decline relative to their U.S. counterparts. The pur- 
ported gains from opening U.S. markets to Canadian producers receive no sup- 
port from the regression analysis. U.S. tariffs were generally  small, and they 
also tended to be positively correlated (Spearman rank correlation of 0.6) with 
Canadian tariffs. Thus, industries that benefited from more access to US.  mar- 
kets tended to be industries that experienced even larger reductions in the pro- 
tection afforded them by Canadian tariffs. Industries that are consistently more 
cyclical or that produce durable goods declined more during the period 1987- 
92. Interestingly, the strong negative effect of  average relative  size remains 
across all specifications. Thus, the data suggest that the FTA and adverse mac- 
roeconomic factors produced a negative shift in the distribution of relative in- 
dustry size. Meanwhile, the variance of that distribution declined. 
12.3  Conclusions 
This paper extends a two-country model of intraindustry trade to allow for 
asymmetries in country size, rates of protection, and production costs. While 
12. Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment,  furniture, metals, and miscellaneous man- 
ufactures are all classified as durable goods. Nondurables include paper, textiles, chemicals, food, 
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trade liberalization may generate a large variety of outcomes for the relative 
size of industries in the two countries, the primary prediction of the model is 
that market-access considerations encourage production of differentiated prod- 
ucts to concentrate in the larger of two trading partners. Using data for 128 
matched industries in the United States and Canada for the years  1987 and 
1992, we examine what happened over the period  that the FTA  was imple- 
mented. 
The data reveal that  most Canadian industries experienced relative  ship- 
ments reductions from 1987 to 1992, a result consistent with the model. Our 
examination of the distribution of these reductions across industries indicates 
that they are related to Canadian tariff reductions and the business cycle. Thus, 
the elimination of Canadian protection and a deeper recession in Canada partly 
explain the relative decline of Canadian manufacturing over this period. We 
could  not,  however,  provide  evidence  that  Canadian  dollar  appreciation 
harmed specific industries. Moreover, US. tariff reductions do not appear to 
have increased relative output in Canada. Indeed, our regressions consistently 
yield the wrong sign for U.S. tariffs, although the estimates lack statistical sig- 
nificance. 
A striking feature of the data is that Canadian industries that were relatively 
strong in  1987 did not expand after trade liberalization; rather, they were the 
ones that suffered the greatest relative declines. Our statistical evidence indi- 
cates a convergence in relative size even when we include controls for the tariff 
changes and sensitivity to macroeconomic influences. The observed tendency 
of  the industry cross section to converge during the period 1987-92  suggests 
that some underlying source of variation in relative size has become less im- 
portant.  Some possible  mechanisms  would  include  convergence  in  North 
American  factor prices  or production  technologies.  Overall,  it appears that 
trade liberalization explains only a small part of the changes in US.  and Cana- 
dian manufacturing from 1987 to 1992. 
References 
Baldwin, J., P.  Gorecki, and J. McVey.  1986. Canada-U.S. productivity differences in 
the manufacturing sector: 1970-79. In Canadian industry in transition, ed. D. McFe- 
tridge. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Bloskie, C. 1991. Industry output in recessions. Canadian Economic Observer 4:3.1- 
3.15. 
Gaston, N., and D. Trefler. 1994. The role of international trade and trade policy in the 
labour markets of Canada and the United States. World Economy 17:45-62. 
Grubel, H., and P. Lloyd. 1975. Zntra-industry trade. New York: Wiley. 
Hazledine, T.  1994. Free trade: What happened? University of Auckland. Mimeo. (Pa- 
per prepared for the annual meeting of the Canadian Economics Association.) 
Head, K., J. Ries, and M. Zhang. 1995. A correspondence between constructed manu- 
facturing  industries,  Canadian  SICs,  United  States  SICs,  and  United  Nations 
SITCs. Mimeo. 342  Keith Head and John Ries 
Helliwell, J. 1995. Do national borders matter for Quebec’s trade? Working Paper no. 
52 15. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Helpman, E., and P. R. Krugman. 1985. Market structure and foreign trade: Increasing 
returns, imperfect competition, and the international trade. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Krugman, P.  1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of  trade. 
American Economic Review 70:950-59. 
Krugman, P., and G. Hanson. 1993. Mexico4J.S. free trade and the location of produc- 
tion. In The Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, ed. P. M. Garber. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
McCallum,  J.  1995. National  borders  matter:  Canada-U.S.  regional  trade  patterns. 
American Economic Review 85:615-23. 
Quah, D. 1993. Galton’s fallacy and tests of the convergence hypothesis. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 95:427-43. 
Statistics Canada.  1993. Trade patterns: Canada-United States, the manufacturing  in- 
dustries, 1981-1991. Catalog no. 65-504E. Ottowa. 
US-Canada  Automotive  Agreement  Policy  Research  Project.  1985.  The  US.- 
Canadian Automotive Products Agreement of  1965: An evaluation for its twentieth 
year: Policy Research Project Report no. 68. University of Texas, Austin, Lyndon B. 
Johnson School of Public Affairs. 